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Motions to Vacate a Default Judgment for
Lack of Jurisdiction
Ariel Waldmant
Suppose a plaintiff files a civil complaint in federal court. Sup-
pose further that the defendant learns of the action but believes that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction. The defendant may choose to ap-
pear in the action and challenge the court's jurisdiction.'
Alternatively, the defendant may choose to risk a default judg-
ment. A civil defendant might wait to contest a judgment until after
the entry of default, or until the plaintiff obtains and seeks to register
a default judgment, for a number of reasons. The defendant may be-
lieve that settlement is possible, may prefer to postpone the expendi-
ture of her time and money until a later date,2 or may wish to contest
jurisdiction in a forum closer to her assets. Since the plaintiff may
move for the court to attach these assets, this wait and challenge ap-
proach may allow a defendant to appear in a forum closer to home,
where the defendant has a more prominent presence and better access
to choice legal counsel than she does in the forum of the issuing court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) allows a defendant to attack
a default judgment by subsequently challenging the personal jurisdic-
tion of the court that issued the judgment.'
Which party should bear the burden of proof in such a motion?
Rule 60 is silent on the issue and the other federal rules provide no
explicit answers. However, the controlling burden of proof rule is of-
ten critical: in over 90 percent of the reported cases where courts have
ruled on Rule 60(b)(4) motions to void a default judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the party bearing the burden of proof has lost.'
The allocation of the burden of proof may drive a case's final disposi-
tion.
t B.S. 1996, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 2001, The University of Chicago.
1 Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may challenge personal jurisdiction. FRCP 12(b)(2).
2 See, for example, Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations 44
(Aspen 3d ed 1997) (A party has a right to ignore a "harassing" or ineffectual suit for any reason
if convinced that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.).
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) allows the court to relieve the party from a fi-
nal judgment that is void. FRCP 60(b)(4).
4 See note 165 and accompanying text.
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This question of how the burden of proof should be allocated in
Rule 60(b)(4) motions advanced on personal jurisdiction grounds has
caused sharp and, to date, unresolved conflict among the lower federal
courts. The Supreme Court and most of the federal appellate courts
have not squarely addressed this narrow but important question. Fur-
ther, despite the lack of a clear rule for allocating the burden of proof
in Rule 60(b)(4) motions based on personal jurisdiction, scholars have
overlooked the issue
This Comment attempts to fill in that analytical gap. Part I de-
fines the elements of a personal jurisdiction challenge and discusses
these challenges and the burden of proof in the context of Rules 12,
55, and 60. Part II analyzes the competing approaches courts have
employed to allocate the burden of proof for 60(b)(4) motions ad-
vanced on personal jurisdiction grounds. Part III argues that courts
should adopt a rule placing the burden on the movant but should con-
dition the remedy to mitigate any resulting inequities.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, CHALLENGES TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION, AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is a court's power to bind a party with ajudgment.6 Without personal jurisdiction, a civil judgment, whether de-
fault or merits-based, may be devoid of legal authority; valid personal
jurisdiction is required for a court to enforce a judgment. For a court
5 Two annotated treatises have briefly addressed the allocation of the burden of proof for
Rule 60 motions or motions to set aside default judgments. See Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation,
Who Has Burden of Proof in Proceeding Under Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to Have Default Judgment Set Aside on Ground That it is Void for Lack of Jurisdiction, 102
ALR Fed 811 (1991 & Supp 2000); Annotation, Burden of Proof Under FR Civ P, Rule 60(b)(4),
47 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 860 (1995 & Supp 1999). For a discussion of 60(b)(4) challenges gen-
erally, see Milton Roberts, Annotation, Lack of Jurisdiction, or Jurisdictional Error, as Rendering
Federal District Court Judgment "Void" For Purposes of Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 ALR Fed 831 (1982 & Supp 2000); John Sutham, Note, Brokering a
Difficult Marriage: Substantive Defenses Under Rule 60(b)(4) Relief from Default Judgments in
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Proceedings, 14 Fordham Intl L J 216,223-26 (1990-91).
6 See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, 728 (1877) (holding that the validity of a judgment de-
pends upon the proper jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment). Courts and commenta-
tors use the Latin term "in personam jurisdiction" interchangeably with "personal jurisdiction";
for simplicity, this Comment uses only the English variant. See Black's Law Dictionary 791 (West
6th ed 1990).
7 Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc v LPG Gem, Ltd, 953 F2d 21,23 (1st Cir 1992) (hold-
ing that a default judgment entered by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant is
void); Venable v Haislip, 721 F2d 297, 300 (10th Cir 1983) ("If the underlying judgment is void
for lack of personal ... jurisdiction ... the district court must grant relief."); Textile Banking Co v
Rentschuler, 657 F2d 844, 850 (7th Cir 1981) ("[I]f the underlying judgment is void because the
court lacked personal ... jurisdiction ... the trial judge has no discretion and must grant appro-
priate Rule 60(b) relief."). See generally Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay
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to have valid personal jurisdiction over a defendant, three elements
must be satisfied. First, either a valid statute of the forum state or the
state's common law must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant.8 Second, the due process provisions of the United
States Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments must permit
that grant of jurisdiction Third, the defendant must be "properly
brought" before the court in the particular action.'° Either the defen-
dant's waiver of her personal jurisdiction objection through voluntary
appearance in the action" or valid service of process on the defendant
"in strict conformance" with the authorizing statute may satisfy this
third condition. 2
B. Personal Jurisdiction Challenges and the Burden of Proof
A defendant may challenge any of these requisite elements of the
issuing court's personal jurisdiction. The defendant may initiate this
challenge prior to appeal at one of three stages in the litigation." For
Kane, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (West 2d ed 1995); James Wm. Moore, 7 Moore's
Federal Practice [ 60.25[2] (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1996).
8 Leab v Streit, 584 F Supp 748,755 (S D NY 1984) (noting that the court must determine
whether the appropriate lawmakers have chosen to grant the power to exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant).
9 See Bank Brussels Lambert v Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F3d 779, 784 (2d Cir
1999) (stating that a court must determine whether exercise of jurisdiction over the parties is
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of due process); Leab, 584 F Supp at 755 (noting the
court must determine whether the grant of jurisdictional power comports with constitutional
limitations upon the exercise of jurisdiction over a person).
10 Leab,584 F Supp at 755.
11 "Appearance" in this context refers to a general appearance, where the party offers a
"simple and unqualified or unrestricted submission to the jurisdiction of the court." Black's Law
Dictionary at 97 (cited in note 6). This is in contrast to a special appearance, which is an appear-
ance to challenge the sufficiency of service or the court's jurisdiction. Id.
12 Veeck v Commodity Enterprises, Inc, 487 F2d 423, 426 (9th Cir 1973) (holding that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the plaintiffs service was not in
strict conformance with Rule 4). See also Mississippi Publishing Corp v Murphree, 326 US 438,
444-45 (1946) ("[Slervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and juris-
diction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.");
In re Bracket, 243 BR 910, 913 (Bankr N D Ga 2000), quoting Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40
(1940) ("It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation ... to which he has not been made a party by
service of process."); Leab, 584 F Supp at 760 (invalidating personal jurisdiction because of de-
fective service).
13 The filing of a motion under Rule 60 does not affect the time in which an appeal must be
filed. See Browder v Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 US 257,263 n 7 (1978).
The filing of an appeal, however, will deprive the district court of jurisdiction to decide the Rule
60(b)(4) motion if the court has not already done so. See Crateo, Inc v Intermark, Inc, 536 F2d
862, 869 (9th Cir 1976). Nevertheless, "some courts will at least indicate on the record that they
would grant the motion if the case were remanded by the Court of Appeals, which may influence
the appellate court to remand for the purpose, rather than expend the time and effort required
to decide the appeal." Kruk, 102 ALR Fed at 817 (cited in note 5). However, "after the appellate
court has decided the issues raised in the appeal, if it elects to do so, the lower court can then
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challenges at each of the three stages, the question arises as to which
party bears the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction.
1. Challenges, prior to a judgment, under Rule 12: the burden is
on the plaintiff.
First, the defendant may elect to respond to the complaint by fil-
ing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for "lack of jurisdiction over the
person."'4 Should the defendant choose to file a Rule 12 motion chal-
lenging the court's personal jurisdiction, the defendant may concomi-
tantly offer arguments on the substantive merits of a complaint's
cause(s) of action.'" In this situation, where the defendant does argue
personal jurisdiction in the motion to dismiss, the defendant, if the
motion is denied, can later pursue on direct appeal both the jurisdic-
tional issue and arguments germane to the merits.'6 If the defendant
files the Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the defendant is precluded from re-
newing, prior to appeal, the jurisdictional attack in a collateral pro-
ceeding such as a post-judgment motion under Rule 60.'"
Generally, civil plaintiffs bear the burden of proof." As the parties
seeking legal remedies, '9 plaintiffs assume the burden of proving theirright to relief in the substantive cause of action.n Plaintiffs' burden of
again assume jurisdiction and act on the Rule 60(b)(4) motion." Id. Of course, in order to raise
the personal jurisdiction objection on appeal, it is "well settled" that the defendant must have
previously raised the objection below. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran,
905 F2d 438,453 (DC Cir 1990).
14 FRCP 12(b)(2).
15 See Practical Concepts, Inc v Republic of Bolivia, 811 F2d 1543, 1547 (DC Cir 1987) (R.
Ginsburg) (If defendant pursues the jurisdictional challenge within the suit, the party may also
defend on the merits.), citing Baldwin v Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 US 522, 525
(1931). However, if the defendant's motion to dismiss addresses only issues extrinsic to personal
jurisdiction, Rule 12(h) provides that the defendant generally waives its personal jurisdiction de-
fense. FRCP 12(h)(1). See also Swaim v Moltan Co, 73 F3d 711, 717 (7th Cir 1996) (stating in
dicta that a defendant's failure to argue the issue of personal jurisdiction in a responsive plead-
ing typically amounts to a waiver of personal jurisdiction).
16 Practical Concepts, 811 F2d at 1547.
17 See id at 1545-48, 1552.
18 The term "burden of proof' usually "refers to two different burdens: the burden of pro-
duction and the burden of persuasion." John J. Cound, et al, Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials
992 (West 7th ed 1997). The burden of production requires only that the party produce sufficient
evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could find in its favor; therefore, one can meet the
burden of production even if the opposing party refutes all of the evidence produced. Id. If the
burden of production is met in a civil action, the case can move forward to the stage of persua-
sion. Id. In this sense, the party bearing the burden of persuasion bears the risk of nonpersuasion.
Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 324 (Little,
Brown 4th ed 1992) (Civil jury instructions commonly direct the jury to rule against the party
with the burden of persuasion in the event of a tie.).
19 A remedy is "anything a court can do for a litigant who has been wronged or is about to
be wronged." Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 1 (Little,
Brown 2d ed 1994).
20 See Charles C. McCormick, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 428 (West 4th ed 1992)
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establishing their right to relief includes the burden of establishing the
existence of valid personal jurisdiction.2 In Rule 12(b)(2) motions
where the defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations of personal jurisdiction, courts have consistently held that
plaintiffs retain this burden.22 Thus, in motions to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(2), plaintiffs, consistent with their overall burden of prov-
ing their claim at trial, bear the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction.
2. Challenges to an entry of default under Rule 55: the burden is
on the plaintiff.
a) Distinguishing an entry of default from a default judgment. A
defendant who declines to file a Rule 12 motion may challenge the
court's personal jurisdiction at one of two subsequent stages in litiga-
tion: either following the entry of default or following an adverse de-
fault judgment.23 A default occurs when a defendant "has failed to de-
fend against a claim ... brought by another party," often by failing to
appear at trial." An entry of default, then, is the formal judicial "rec-
ognition of the fact that one party is in default.""' An entry of default
is "a non-final order" that is "not appealable.
'26
A default judgment, in contrast, requires the court to ascertain
the precise remedy and the "measure of recovery." In support of a
motion for a default judgment, a plaintiff first files an entry of default,
and then may present evidence concerning the precise remedy at a
hearing if the court so orders.2 While defendants generally receive no-
(John William Strong, ed) ("The burdens of pleading and proof... have been ... assigned to the
plaintiff[,] who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally
should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.").
21 McNutt v General Motors Acceptance Corp, 298 US 178, 189 (1936) (Because the plain-
tiff "is seeking relief ... it follows that he must carry throughout the litigation the burden of
showing that he is properly in court.").
22 See Bank Brussels Lambert v Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F3d 779, 784 (2d Cir
1999) ("When responding to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.");
Ballard v Savage, 65 F3d 1495,1498 (9th Cir 1995) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, plain-
tiff must "demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction"); Bally Export Corp v Bali-
car, Ltd, 804 F2d 398,401 (7th Cir 1986) ("Normally it is well established that the plaintiff must
prove jurisdiction exists once it is challenged by the defendant.").
23 See, for example, Enron Oil Corp v Diakuhara, 10 F3d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir 1993) (analyz-
ing the propriety of both the lower court's entry of default and its default judgment).
24 Black's Law Dictionary at 417-18 (cited in note 6).
25 Cound, et al, Civil Procedure at 912-13 (cited in note 18), quoting Wright, Miller, and
Kane, 10 Federal Practice and Procedure at § 2692 (cited in note 7).
26 Enron, 10 F3d at 95 (reviewing the procedural requirements for default judgments).
27 Cound, et al, Civil Procedure at 913 (cited in note 18). See FRCP 55(b). See also Enron,
10 F3d at 95.
28 See FRCP 55(b). See also Enron, 10 F3d at 95.
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tice of the hearing, a defendant's wait and challenge strategy often
means that the hearing is held in the defendant's absence. 9 Once the
plaintiff obtains a default judgment, the plaintiff may register the
judgment for collection in any federal judicial district, often the dis-
trict where the defendant's principal assets are located." Unlike the
entry of default, which is a non-final interlocutory order, the default
judgment is a final action and may be appealed."
Following either an entry of default or a subsequent default
judgment, the defendant may raise the issue of personal jurisdiction in
a collateral proceeding.12 For such collateral proceedings, Rules 55 and
60 provide the framework for defendants to challenge the validity of
the original issuing court's personal jurisdiction.
Rule 55 distinguishes between the setting aside of "an entry of
default" and the setting aside of a "judgment by default."33 Under Rule
55(c), courts may vacate an entry of default for any "good cause
shown."'  In applying the good cause standard, courts enjoy "consider-
able latitude."" As discussed in Part I.B.3, the standard for vacating a
default judgment is similarly open-ended.
b) The burden of proof in motions to vacate an entry of default.
For defendants' Rule 55 motions to vacate an entry of default-just as
for Rule 12 motions to dismiss-plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
that the court has personal jurisdiction. The one court that allocated
the burden to the defendant was reversed. In General Contracting &
29 See, for example, Callier v Gray, 167 F3d 977,978-79 (6th Cir 1999) (Defendant was not
present at evidentiary hearing.).
30 See 28 USC § 1963 (1994) (providing for the registration of federal judgments in other
judicial districts for enforcement); Drexler v Kozloff, 2000 US App LEXIS 6761, *5-6 (10th Cir)
(noting the propriety of the plaintiff's registration of a judgment issued by a federal district court
in Colorado in a federal district court in the Southern District of New York). The plaintiff may
register the judgment in federal court regardless of the court in which the original judgment was
issued. See 28 USC § 1963. Federal courts must also give a foreign state court judgment "the
same full faith and credit" as it "would have in the courts of the state from which it came." Drex-
ler, 2000 US App LEXIS 6761 at *8 (citations omitted).
31 See Enron, 10 F3d at 95 (reviewing procedural requirements for default judgments).
32 Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 706
(1982) (A party may always ignore a judicial proceeding and challenge the default judgment on
jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.). This challenge to the issuing court's jurisdic-
tion may be brought in either the issuing court or the court of registration. See Graciette v Star
Guidance, Inc, 66 FRD 424,426 (S D NY 1975) (noting that a void judgment may be challenged
by collateral attack in any court where its validity is an issue).
33 Cound, et al, Civil Procedure at 912 (cited in note 18).
34 FRCP 55(c).
35 Sparton Engineered Products, Inc v Cable Control Technologies, Inc, 1999 US App
LEXIS 2283, *9 (6th Cir) (unpublished opinion) ("When a defendant seeks relief from a default
that has been entered ... by the clerk upon a plaintiff's request, the district court enjoys consid-
erable latitude under the 'good cause shown' standard of [Rule 55(c)]."). See also Johnson v
Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co, 140 F3d 781,785 (8th Cir 1998) ("Rule 55 issues are commit-
ted to the district court's discretion ....").
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Trading Co v Interpole, Inc," the First Circuit reviewed a district
court's denial of the defendant's motion to set aside an entry of de-
fault.37 In denying the defendant's motion, the district court had placed
the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that the court lacked
jurisdiction. Reversing, the First Circuit emphasized the "fundamen-
tal relationship of the jurisdictional inquiry to the judicial task,"39 and
held that "the burden of proving jurisdiction rests with the party as-
serting the affirmative of the proposition." ° The court concluded that
the district court "erred in never placing the devoir of persuasion on
[the plaintiff]."4' Thus, for motions to set aside an entry of default, "the
burden of demonstrating the existence of personal jurisdiction ... re-
mains with the plaintiff after the plaintiff has obtained a default. 42 In
ruling on the defendant's Rule 55(c) motion to vacate the entry of de-
fault, a court should resolve "[a]ny doubts ... in favor of setting aside
a default so that a determination may be made on the merits of the
case. 4 3 Numerous other courts have similarly placed the burden on
the plaintiff in Rule 55(c) motions to vacate an entry of default due to
lack of personal jurisdiction."
3. Challenges to a default judgment under Rule 60: whose
burden?
For motions to vacate a default judgment, as opposed to an entry
of default, Rule 55(c) permits a court to grant the motion "in accor-
dance with Rule 60(b)."' Rule 60(b), in turn, provides that "[o]n mo-
tion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
36 899 F2d 109 (1st Cir 1990).
37 Id at ill.
38 Id at 115-16.
39 Id at 116.
40 Id at 115, quoting Donatelli v National Hockey League, 893 F2d 459,468 (1st Cir 1990).
41 General Contracting, 899 F2d at 115-16 (remanding the cause of action to the lower
court for the issue of personal jurisdiction "to be aired more fully").
42 Southmark San Juan, Inc v Abbas Atash-Sobh, 1994 WL 1031279, *2 (Va Cir Ct) (follow-
ing General Contracting in placing the burden on the plaintiff in a motion to vacate an entry of
default).
43 Lichtenstein v Jewelart, Inc, 95 FRD 511,513 (E D NY 1982).
44 See, for example, Enron, 10 F3d at 96, 98. In reversing the district court's denial of the
defendant's Rule 55(c) motion to vacate an entry of default, the court stated "because defaults
are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions, when doubt exists as to whether a
default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting
party .... [Wihat is clear is that under the case law all doubts must be resolved in favor of trial
on the merits." Id. See also Barnes v Printron, Inc, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 7726, *6 (S D NY) ("Be-
cause the record does not permit the Court to determine ... whether service upon that person
would satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.E 4, the Court must conclude that the default
[judgment] is void."); Lichtenstein, 95 FRD at 513 n 3 (granting Rule 55(c) motion because it was
"[riesolving the doubt in favor of the defendant").
45 FRCP 55(c).
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party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reason[ ] ... the judgment is void."'
In the Rule 60(b)(4) context, the term "void" encompasses any
"default judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant., 47 This definition is well-settled: it is "beyond
peradventure that a void judgment, such as one ehtered by a court
which lacks personal jurisdiction ... is a nullity."'4 Courts are barred
from enforcing these void judgments; if a court analyzing a 60(b)(4)
motion to vacate finds that the issuing court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion, the court lacks any discretion and must refuse to enforce the
41judgment. Courts are required to grant relief from default judgment
upon a showing of lack of jurisdiction in 60(b)(4) motions because
"[e]ither a judgment is void or it is valid."5 Therefore, defendants sub-
ject to a void judgment can rely on Rule 60 to prevent the enforce-
ment of the adverse default judgment.
An entry of default and a default judgment, while distinct, are
closely related steps in a plaintiff's pursuit of her cause of action. The
language in Rules 55 and 60, authorizing relief from entry of default
and default judgment, is similar. Under Rule 55(c), as stated, a court
may set aside an entry of default for "any good cause shown."'" Rule
60(b) also employs a rather open-ended grant of judicial discretion,
providing that the reviewing court may relieve a party from a final
judgment "upon such terms as are just," including when "the judgment
is void."'2 Additionally, the two types of attacks occur at functionally
equivalent stages in the litigation process, both after the entry of de-
fault, but before the defendant has responded to the plaintiff's com-
plaint.
46 FRCP 60(b).
47 Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc v LPG Gem, Lid, 953 F2d 21,23 (1st Cir 1992).
48 General Contracting, 899 F2d at 114.
49 See Bally Export Corp v Balicar, Ltd, 804 F2d 398, 400 (7th Cir 1986) (holding that
"when the rule 60(b)(4) motion alleges that that 'the underlying judgment is void because the
court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction,' once the court decides that the allegations
are correct, 'the trial judge has no discretion and must grant appropriate Rule 60(b) relief");
Gulf Coast Fans, Inc v Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc, 740 F2d 1499,1511-12 (11 th Cir 1984)
(holding that the district court's refusal to set aside a default judgment constituted an abuse of
discretion where the presence of personal jurisdiction was not established); Venable v Haislip,
721 F2d 297,300 (10th Cir 1983) (stating that if a judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, the court must grant relief). See also Wright, Miller, and Kane; 11 Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure at § 2862 (cited in note 7) ("There is no question of discretion on the part of the court
when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4).") (collecting cases).
50 Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp v Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa Rica, 614 F2d 1247,
1256 (9th Cir 1980) (holding there was a duty to vacate since the defendant's Rule 60(b)(4) mo-
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Thus, a court reviewing a Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging per-
sonal jurisdiction must find the default judgment void in order to va-
cate the judgment. It is far from clear, however, which party bears the
burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction. As the following
discussion demonstrates, unlike the standard for personal jurisdiction
challenges advanced under Rules 12 and 55, courts have failed to de-
velop a uniform rule in Rule 60(b)(4) motions for allocating the bur-
den of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction.
II. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN IN MOTIONS TO VACATE A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AS VOID FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
This Comment makes two principal claims, one descriptive and
one normative. In Part III, this Comment develops a normative claim
as to which rule should control in allocating the burden of proof in
Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate a default judgment for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. This Part focuses on the descriptive claim that
courts are divided in their approach to allocating the burden of proof.
This division is even more pronounced than recent courts have recog-
nized. Courts have employed four competing approaches to allocating
the burden in Rule 60(b)(4) motions, two major and two "outlier" ap-
proaches.
A. Rockwell: The View That the Burden Remains with the Plaintiff
A number of district courts in the Second, 3 Third," Fifth," and
Sixth 6 Circuits have held that the burden of proof remains with the
plaintiff in a motion to vacate a default judgment as void for lack of
personal jurisdiction. In Rockwell International Corp v KND Corp,'
the court reviewed the defendant's 60(b)(4) motion and held that the
plaintiff bore the burden to establish personal jurisdiction for two rea-
53 See Ocala Waste Disposal Associates v GGC, Inc, 1993 US Dist LEXIS 5578, *5 (S D
NY) (explaining that "[aldequacy of service is an element of personal jurisdiction, and the bur-
den of proof as to its adequacy is on the party asserting that jurisdiction exists"); Triad Energy
Corp v McNeil, 110 FRD 382, 385 (S D NY 1986) (holding that when "personal jurisdiction is
contested under Rule 60(b)(4), the burden of proof is properly placed on the party asserting that
jurisdiction existed"); Leab v Streit, 584 F Supp 748,760 (S D NY 1984) (same).
54 See Packard Press Corp v Com Vu Corp, 584 F Supp 73, 75-76 (E D Pa 1984) ("The
Court has a continuing duty to ensure that such jurisdiction exists before advancing to the
merits. ... When the court's in personam jurisdiction is challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff
must prove that the non-resident defendant's activities in the forum state are sufficient to bring
it within the reach of this court's jurisdiction."); DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc v Mainrnan
Ltd, 421 F Supp 116 (W D Pa 1976).
55 See Rockwell International Corp v KND Corp, 83 FRD 556 (N D Tex 1979).
56 Sterling Industrial Corp v Telephone, Inc, 484 F Supp 1294,1296 (W D Mich 1980) (hold-
ing that "[w]hen a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant").
57 83 FRD 556 (N D Tex 1979).
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sons.7 First, the court stated, "it is difficult to understand how such a
burden [on the defendant] would work."9 Second, reasoned the court,
"it is the plaintiff that typically offers events or circumstances that it
characterizes as meeting state statutory and federal due process stan-
dards.,,6°
Similarly, in DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc v Mainman Ltd,"
the plaintiff filed suit in a state court against several defendants, in-
cluding the entertainer David Bowie.6 The plaintiff obtained a default
judgment from the state court against Bowie and registered that
judgment in a federal district court. Bowie moved to vacate the de-
fault judgment, arguing that the service of process in the original state
court action was improper and that the subsequent judgment was
therefore void for lack of personal jurisdiction.' In granting the mo-
tion to vacate, the court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of
proving that it had satisfied the service of process component of per-
sonal jurisdiction, required by the relevant long-arm statute, by mail-
61ing notice of the default judgment to Bowie's last known address.
Because the plaintiff failed to carry its burden, the state court never
obtained proper jurisdiction over Bowie and the default judgment was
void and vacated by the district court for this reason.66
A number of subsequent courts have likewise placed the burden
of proof on the nonmovant plaintiff in Rule 60(b)(4) motions to va-
cate a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.6 Aside from
iterating the proposition that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
and providing citations, these courts have offered no further rationale
for adopting the rule beyond the terse justifications articulated in
Rockwell and DiCesare. Thus, the view that the burden remains with
the plaintiff, while fairly prevalent among lower federal courts, is
largely undertheorized.
B. Rohm: The View That the Burden Shifts to the Defendant
In contrast to the Rockwell line of authority, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals6 and certain lower courts in the Second 69 and Elev-
58 See id at 559 n 1.
59 Id. The court further contended, with no further elaboration, that the characteristics of
Rule 60(b)(4) cases do not favor allocating the burden to the defendant. Id.
60 Id.




65 Id at 120-21.
66 Idat 121.
67 See cases cited in notes 53-56.
68 See Bally Export Corp v Balicar, Ltd, 804 F2d 398, 401 (7th Cir 1986), discussed in text
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enth7° Circuits have held that defendants with notice of a lawsuit who
challenge a default judgment on jurisdictional grounds must bear the
burden of proof. Notice in this context appears to refer to evidence of
the defendant's awareness or knowledge of the suit, rather than a
strict definition linked to statutorily established service of process re-
quirements. 
Rohm & Haas Co v Aries" was the first judicial opinion to depart
openly from the Rockwell rule. In Rohm, the district court analyzed
the defendant-purchaser's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a twenty-
year-old monetary default judgment registered by the plaintiff-
supplier as void for lack of personal jurisdiction." In addressing the
burden of proof, the court, citing no authority, criticized and then re-
jected the Rockwell approach." The court stated that the reasoning
underlying those courts' allocation of the burden to the plaintiff "fails
to consider that a defendant who was on notice of the original pro-
ceedings had an opportunity, at that time, to oppose jurisdiction by a
Rule 12 motion."7 The Rohm court noted that for Rule 12 motions,
unlike for Rule 60 motions, the rule requiring plaintiffs to bear the
burden of proof avoids prejudice to the plaintiff because all evidence
needed to prove jurisdiction is readily available. 6 For Rule 60(b) mo-
accompanying notes 80-83. District courts in the Seventh Circuit have consistently followed this
rule. See, for example, Invest L'Inc v ITS International, Inc, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 17915, *6-7 (N
D I11) (allocating the burden of proof on personal jurisdiction to defendants bringing the
60(b)(4) collateral attack); Carr v Pouilloux, SA, 947 F Supp 393,395 (C D I11 1996) (same).
69 See Miller v Jones, 779 F Supp 207,210 (D Conn 1991) (holding that the burden of dem-
onstrating lack of personal jurisdiction shifts to the defendant who was properly served but
failed to appear in the original proceeding); International Housing Ltd v Rafidain Bank Iraq, 712
F Supp 1112, 1114, 1119-20 (S D NY 1989) (vacating a default judgment against a foreign sover-
eign defendant due to lack of minimum contacts, but placing jurisdictional burden on the defen-
dant), revd on other grounds, 893 F2d 8 (2d Cir 1989). Thus, not only is there a circuit split re-
garding the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction in 60(b)(4) motions, but also
there is a split within the Second Circuit. Compare Miller, 779 F Supp at 210, and International
Housing, 712 F Supp at 1114, with Ocala Waste Disposal Associates v GGC, Inc, 1993 US Dist
LEXIS 5578, *5 (S D NY) (following the Rockwell rule of placing the burden on the plaintiff);
Triad Energy Corp v McNeil, 110 FRD 382,385 (S D NY 1986) (same); Leab v Streit, 584 F Supp
748,760 (S D NY 1984) (same).
70 In re Brackett, 243 BR 910, 914 (Bankr N D Ga 2000) (stating that the burden lies with
the defaulting party raising the challenge and defendants' mere assertion that service was not re-
ceived is insufficient).
71 See China Mariners' Assurance Corp v MTWM Vacy Ash, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674,
*22 (S D NY) (distinguishing defendant's receipt of notice from defendant's receipt of service of
process pursuant to FRCP 4(h)(1) and NY CPLR § 311.1 (McKinney 2000) in conformity with
the full requirements of the statute in the context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion advanced on per-
sonal jurisdiction grounds).
72 103 FRD 541 (S D NY 1984).
73 Id at 542-43.
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tions, however, the court reasoned, "Should the burden of proof be
lodged with the plaintiff, severe prejudice can result when evidence
needed to prove jurisdiction is no longer available due to the passage
of time."" Therefore, the court concluded, it is "not unfair" to place the
burden on a defendant who was on notice at the time of the original
proceeding if the defendant chooses to wait until after the entry of an
adverse default judgment to attack the court's personal jurisdiction."
Allocating the burden of proof to the defendant, the court found that
the defendant had failed to meet his burden and denied the motion."
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals to adopt
the Rohm court's approach. In Bally Export Corp v Balicar, Ltd,81 the
Seventh Circuit adopted the Rohm court's reasoning and rejected the
Rockwell rule:
We believe that the approach taken by the court in Rohm &
Haas is the better one. If the defendant, after receiving notice,
chooses to let the case go to a default judgment, the defendant
must then shoulder the burden of proof when the defendant de-
cides to contest jurisdiction in a post-judgment rule 60(b)(4) mo-
tion. '
The court held that the defendants had not met their burden and af-
firmed denial of the motion."3
A number of district courts have expressly followed Rohm and
Bally in rejecting the Rockwell rule. A recent survey observed that
77 Id (noting that the original default judgment at issue was nearly twenty years old).
78 Id. Significantly, the Rohm court did not qualify its holding by limiting its burden on the
defendant rule to situations where extensive time elapsed between the default judgment and the
subsequent motion to vacate, as was the case in Rohm itself. However, the court did use the pas-
sage of time as one factor it considered in allocating the burden to the defendant. Id.
79 Id at 545. While the Rohm court states that if the plaintiff had shouldered the burden,
the outcome would have been the same, the court's treatment of the notice issue would have
likely been affected. See id at 545 n 2.
80 Remarkably, the Seventh Circuit is also the only circuit court of appeals to delineate ex-
plicitly a rule for allocating the burden of proof for 60(b)(4) motions based on personal jurisdic-
tion. See, for example, Drexler v Kozloff, 2000 US App LEXIS 6761, *13 n 1 (10th Cir) ("[W]e do
not here decide the question of who bears the burden of establishing whether in personam juris-
diction existed over a defendant in a proceeding brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) to set aside a
default judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of such jurisdiction.").
81 804 F2d 398 (7th Cir 1986).
82 Id at 401. The scope of disagreement between the Rohm and Rockwell approaches is
limited to situations where the court has evidence that the defendant knew of the action at the
time of the original default judgment. Where the defendant had no such notice, as even the Sev-
enth Circuit in Bally acknowledged, the burden indisputably remains with the plaintiff. See id
(noting that by shifting the burden to the defendant, the court "presumes the defendant was on
notice at the time of the original proceeding"), quoting Rohm, 103 FRD at 544.
83 Bally, 804 F2d at 403 (holding that the defendants conducted sufficient business in Illi-
nois to be captured under the state's long-arm statute).
84 See the cases cited in notes 68-70.
85 See, for example, Brackett, 243 BR at 914 (holding that the burden lies with the default-
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"the general trend throughout the Circuits, and in the Second Circuit,
is toward imposing the burden of proof on the party moving to vacate
a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). ' '"
Only one court, however, has added any further rationale for the
rule placing the burden of proof on the movant-defendant to establish
a lack of personal jurisdiction. In Miller v Jones,7 the court denied a
motion to vacate and addressed the split between the Rockwell and
Rohm lines of authority. M Echoing the court in Rohm, the Miller court
cited the "fear of prejudice against a plaintiff who, owing to delay,
might in subsequent collateral proceedings no longer have evidence of
personal jurisdiction that existed at the time of the underlying suit. ' '9
However, the Miller court stated three additional policy interests that
were advanced by the Rohm rule: (1) "the concerns of comity among
the district courts of the United States"; (2) "the interest in resolving
disputes in a single judicial proceeding"; and (3) "the interest of the
plaintiff in the choice of forum."' Accordingly, the court adopted the
Rohm rule and found that the defendants had failed to meet their
burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction.91
C. The Two Outlier Approaches
Some courts have failed to adopt either of these two rules, taking
one of two alternative standard-like approaches.
1. The totality of the circumstances approach.
Certain "outlier" courts base their allocation of the burden on the
specific "circumstances of [the] case."" In Donnely v Copeland Intra
Lenses, Inc, a plaintiff registered a default judgment in a district court
of another state, and subsequently brought an enforcement action
against the defendant in the court of registration." The court of regis-
tration granted the defendant's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate.9' In
addressing the burden of proof issue, the court emphasized the plain-
tiff's relative advantage between the parties in access to information,
and concluded:
ing party challenging judgment on service of process grounds).
86 Kruk, Annotation, 102 ALR Fed at 818 (cited in note 5).
87 779 F Supp 207 (D Conn 1991).
88 Id at 210-11.
89 Id.
90 Idat210.
91 Id at 211-12 ("In light of [defendant's] burden of proof and the scant record before me,
for jurisdictional purposes the court must assume the existence of... personal jurisdiction.").
92 Donnely v Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc, 87 FRD 80,85 (E D NY 1980).
93 87 FRD 80 (E D NY 1980).
94 Id at 82.
95 Id at 86.
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Although the burden of proof in a Rule 60(b) motion is typically
on the movant, it is manifest that in the circumstances of this case
the burden is properly on [the plaintiff] to establish ... that [the
issuing court] had in personam jurisdiction over the ... defen-
dants.9
The court's approach to allocating the burden in China Mariners'
Assurance Corp v MTWM Vacy Ash97 was similarly focused on the
specific facts of the case before the court.98 The court analyzed the de-
fendant's 60(b)(4) motion to vacate as void for lack of personal juris-
diction due to plaintiff's alleged failure properly to serve process." The
court initially stated that since the defendant had notice of the original
suit, the defendant bore the burden of proof on the personal jurisdic-
tion issue."0 The court then applied a burden of proof seemingly at
odds with the Rohm-type burden it had just expressly adopted, stating
that "the highly controverted story behind service in this case" di-
rected the court to void the judgment.' ' Because of a stated policy
preference in favor of resolving disputes on the merits, "where the
parties' accounts of the attempted service differ but both are inher-
ently plausible, and there is nothing in the record upon which to judge
the veracity of either version, a court should credit the version of the
party seeking to vacate the default. ' 0 Having switched the allocation
of the burden from the defendant to the plaintiff, the court held that
the plaintiff had not carried its burden and that the default judgment
was void."3
2. The court address approach.
As noted, Rule 12 provides that a defendant waives her personal
jurisdiction objections unless she raises the issue in a timely respon-
sive pleading. °' However, the right to challenge a court's personal
jurisdiction is not waived when a defendant defaults.'05 When a
96 Id at 85 (first emphasis added).
97 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 (S D NY).
98 Idat*21.
99 Id at *7-21.
100 Id at *10 n 7 ("Defendant bears the burden of proof of establishing its claims for setting
aside the default judgment, and must therefore show that service was not properly effected."),
citing, inter alia, Rohm, 103 FRD at 544.
101 China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 at *21.
102 Id, quoting American Institute of Certified Public Accountants v Affinity Card, Inc, 8 F
Supp 2d 372,377 (S D NY 1998).
103 China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 at *21-27. However, the court questioned
the defendant's account and refused to vacate the judgment, instead directing the plaintiff to re-
serve the defendant.
104 FRCP 12(h)(1); In re Tuli, 172 F3d 707,712 (9th Cir 1999).
105 See Popper v Podhragy, 48 F Supp 2d 268,272 (S D NY 1998), citing Williams v Life Sav-
ings and Loan, 802 F2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir 1986).
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plaintiff seeks a default judgment against a defendant who has de-
clined to plead or otherwise defend, the district court has "an affirma-
tive duty" to review its jurisdiction over the parties. °"
Should the court conclude that it lacks personal jurisdiction, the
court may, sua sponte, dismiss the complaint for lack of personal juris-
diction. ' w This rule is a narrow exception to the general rule that courts
may not dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion." The (healthy) premise underlying this exception is one of finite
judicial reach. The contours of personal jurisdiction limits are
bounded by a court's legitimate power to bind a party with its judg-
ment: "In reviewing its personal jurisdiction, the court.., exercises its
responsibility to determine that it has the power to enforce the default
judgment."'7
Thus, where the plaintiff moves for the entry of a default judg-
ment, the court has the opportunity and duty to review the basis for its
jurisdiction over the parties. However, courts may, for lack of a well-
developed record or for other reasons, postpone their initial review of
the validity of personal jurisdiction until after the issuance of the de-
fault."° At least one court employing such an approach has based its
allocation of the burden on whether the issuing court appears to have
reviewed the personal jurisdiction question in rendering the default
judgment. In Popper v Podhragy,' the defendants failed to answer the
complaint, and the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment. The defen-
dant then moved in the issuing court to vacate the judgment under
Rule 60(b)(4)."2 Addressing the burden issue, the presiding judge
stated, "[T]he Court notified the plaintiff that it had failed to review
the question of personal jurisdiction when it entered the default judg-
ment.' ' .3 Therefore, "plaintiffs continued to bear the burden of proving
personal jurisdiction over defendant.".4 The Popper court's use of the
court address approach appears to have been an attempt to avoid
having to make an explicit choice between the Rockwell rule
106 Garberg & Associates, Inc v Pack-Tech International Corp, 115 F3d 767,771-72 (10th Cir
1997), quoting Williams, 802 F2d at 1202-03.
107 See Tuli, 172 F3d at 712 (holding that a lower court properly raised the issue of personal
jurisdiction sua sponte); Garberg, 115 F3d at 771-72 ("[T]he district court has an affirmative duty
to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.").
108 See Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp v Barrios, 857 F2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir 1988) (holding that a
"district court may not sua sponte dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction except when a default
judgment is to be entered"), citing Williams, 802 F2d at 1203.
109 Garberg, 115 F3d at 772 (emphasis omitted), quoting Williams, 802 F2d at 1202-03.
110 See, for example, Popper, 48 F Supp 2d at 272, discussed in text accompanying notes
111-15.
Ill 48 F Supp 2d 268 (S D NY 1998).
112 Id.
113 Id at 271.
114 Id at272.
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and the Rohm rule. After recognizing that "there is a conflict in the
case law as to which party bears the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction in a Rule 60(b)(4) challenge," the court spent two para-
graphs in a footnote reviewing the Rohm and Rockwell decisions and
their progeny."5 However, the court concluded, "that issue was previ-
ously resolved" since the court did not "review the question of per-
sonal jurisdiction when it entered the default judgment." 6 Thus, some
courts use a more particularized approach, by reviewing either the
specific aspects of the parties' characteristics or conduct, or by review-
ing the scope of the original default judgment hearing. These courts
base their allocation of the burden on the individual circumstances of
the dispute, rather than on a predetermined rule.
In sum, courts' approaches to allocating the burden have evi-
denced enormous variance, even more than recent courts have recog-
nized." ' Courts grappling with the issue of how to allocate the burden
of proof in Rule 60(b)(4) motions to void a default judgment for want
of jurisdiction have employed four different approaches to allocating
the burden: two major approaches, and two "outlier" approaches.
III. COURTS SHOULD PLACE THE BURDEN ON THE
MOVANT BUT SHOULD USE THE REMEDY TO
MITIGATE ANY RESULTING PREJUDICE
Part II showed the tremendous dissensus in the lower federal
courts concerning allocation of the burden of proof in Rule 60(b)(4)
motions advanced on personal jurisdiction grounds. Adoption of a
single consistent approach would clarify the rule and resolve the cir-
cuit split.
This Comment's second principal claim is normative: Courts
should adopt a firm but balanced rule. Courts should follow Rockwell
and DiCesare by requiring that plaintiffs in Rule 60(b)(4) motions
bear the burden of proving that the court issuing the default judgment
had proper personal jurisdiction. In addition, courts should condition
the remedy"8 to mitigate any resulting inequities.
115 Idat 271& n5.
116 Id at 271.
117 Several courts have recognized the division in authority. See Drexler v Kozloff, 2000 US
App LEXIS 6761, *13 n 1 (10th Cir) (noting that "the question of who bears the burden of estab-
lishing whether in personarn jurisdiction existed over a defendant in a proceeding brought pur-
suant to rule 60(b)(4)" has engendered a "split in circuits"); Popper, 48 F Supp 2d at 271 (noting
that "there is a conflict in the case law as to which party bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction in a Rule 60(b)(4) challenge"). However, these courts have recognized only
the two main lines of authority: the Rockwell rule discussed in Part II.A and the Rohm rule dis-
cussed in Part II.B.
118 See note 19.
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A. A Bright Line Rule Would Allocate the Burden of Proof
Consistently
Courts should develop a bright line rule for allocating the burden
of proof in Rule 60(b)(4) motions. A clear rule is desirable because it
gives all interested parties notice and because it is more efficient to
administer.
1. Notice.
A fixed rule clearly allocating the burden provides ex ante notice
of how the burden operates. Notice promotes predictability ' and in-
forms interested parties of which rule controls. Establishing a clear
burden allocation rule would aid both categories of future litigants:
plaintiffs would know how much evidence of personal jurisdiction
they need to introduce in the record or need to retain, and defendants
would be better able to decide whether or not to challenge personal
jurisdiction in a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Establishing a clear rule would
also benefit federal courts faced with Rule 60(b)(4) personal jurisdic-
tion challenges, and state courts seeking guidance in their interpreta-
tion of state law analogues to Rule 60.120
The court address test suggested by Popper12 would tell courts
which burden rule should obtain if the issuing court addressed per-
sonal jurisdiction. However, by taking no position as to the appropri-
ate default position, that is, by not choosing between the Rohm and
Rockwell rules, it provides no guidance for courts where the first juris-
dictional review takes place in the court of registration upon the de-
fendant's 60(b)(4) challenge.22
The totality of the circumstances approach, by leaving the alloca-
tion to the factual details of each case, makes the situation murky at
best, and at worst drives any judicial preferences underground.' A
119 See Karen M. Gebbia-Panetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Le-
gal System Values, 21 Seton Hall Leg J 233, 244-46 (1997) (recognizing predictability as a core
value of a well-ordered legal system).
120 See Matthies v Railroad Retirement Board, 341 F2d 243, 248 (8th Cir 1965) (noting that
§ 60-260 of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure is identical to Federal Rule 60); Estate of Page v
Litzenburg, 865 P2d 128,137 (Ariz App 1993) (recognizing that Arizona courts give great weight
to federal courts' interpretations of Rule 60 in interpreting identical text of Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 60). See also Roberts, Annotation, 59 ALR Fed at 837-38 (cited in note 5) ("[S]ome
state courts have expressly adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and... there are state
court decisions ... interpreting and applying the state equivalent of [Rule 60(b)(4)].").
121 See text accompanying notes 111-16; Part II.C.2.
122 Popper, 48 F Supp 2d at 271 (noting two default rules, but failing to endorse either).
123 See, for example, Donnely, 87 FRD at 85. While the court's totality of the circumstances
approach in Donnely was prompted by underlying considerations of fairness, it could also be un-
derstood as a court's fundamental distaste for third-party proceedings in the courts of other
states.
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party will not know if its case involves "controverted" facts related to
personal jurisdiction that will shift the de facto burden to the plain-
tiff."' By providing courts such enormous discretion to fashion a rule
for allocating the burden in a given case, the totality of the circum-
stances approach amounts to little more than having no rule at all.'25
2. Efficiency.
Adopting a single bright line rule would be efficient. 126 A clear,
fixed rule for allocating the burden would minimize administrative
costs. By adopting such a rule, courts would promote "uniformity in
the federal courts," which is "[olne of the shaping purposes of the
Federal Rules.' 27 Moreover, reducing the variance in different courts'
allocation of the burden would help eliminate the judges' use of "belt
and suspenders" opinions that unnecessarily expend judicial resources
by employing one burden of proof but then, due to a lack of clarity as
to the controlling rule, analyzing the personal jurisdiction issue under
a second, competing burden rule.'
In contrast stand the two outlier approaches: the totality of the
circumstances approach and the court address approach. Because the
totality of the circumstances approach"' requires courts to analyze the
underlying equities of possible prejudice due to the passage of time or
the parties' relative advantages of access to relevant jurisdictional in-
formation,"" the costs of administering such a standard are significant.
Under the proposed rule, there would be certain administrative costs
associated with analyzing prejudice. Net administrative costs, however,
should decrease, because although the court's adoption of a firm rule
for allocating the burden will eliminate virtually all costs at that stage,
a court need only analyze the prejudice issue when the parties raise
124 See China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 at *21.
125 There is, of course, a heated debate among scholars about the merits of rules versus
standards. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22
(1992); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1685-1713
(1976).
126 See Hiroshi Motumura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons
From Civil Procedure, 14 Georgetown Immig L J 385,392 (2000) (noting the prominent role of
efficiency concerns in judicial interpretation of civil procedure issues). See also A.C. Pritchard,
Note, Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic Analysis of the "New Property," 77
Va L Rev 1053, 1073 (1991) (reviewing, in various legal contexts, the ways in which clear rules
can lower the cost of administering rules).
127 Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460,472-73 (1965).
128 See, for example, Rohm, 103 FRD at 545 n 2 ("Even if the burden were placed with peti-
tioner, the result would have been the same.").
129 See Part II.C.1.
130 See Donnely, 87 FRD at 85 (analyzing the latter).
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the issue or where potential prejudice is obvious. Even assuming away
costs, the benefits of the totality of the circumstances approach are
tenuous.
The court address approach.. may also suffer from inefficiency.
Under this approach, a court must memorialize the scope of its review
in the default proceeding. In any subsequent action to enforce the
judgment, especially those where the court of registration differs from
the issuing court, there will be administrative costs associated with re-
viewing the record to determine the extent to which the issuing court
reviewed the personal jurisdiction.
The outlier approaches also create significant line-drawing prob-
lems. How much time must pass for the likelihood of prejudice due to
loss of evidence to trigger the shifting of the burden? How much ac-
cess must the nonmovant have to jurisdiction-establishing facts? Even
with extensive inquiry and analysis, it may be hard to know. Similarly,
the court address approach may also create line-drawing problems:
how much review constitutes "review"? While courts can engage in
line-drawing-they do in many areas of the law'32-the decision costs
may be more significant where such an exercise is mandated. Such
proceedings should not consume courts' finite resources.'33 Courts
should reject both outlier approaches and instead adopt a more effi-
cient bright line rule.
B. The Best Rule Allocates the Burden to the Plaintiff and Uses the
Remedy to Account for Any Unfairness
Part III.A argued'that courts should 4dopt a bright line rule. This
conclusion, however, does not resolve which rule is most desirable.
Courts should follow the Rockwell rule and place the burden of prov-
ing personal jurisdiction on the plaintiff as the party that seeks to es-
tablish the existence of personal jurisdiction. However, while adopting
the Rockwell rule, courts, in crafting a remedy, should seize on the lan-
guage of Rule 60 to account for possible harm to plaintiffs. Rule 60(b)
provides that a judgment may be vacated "upon such terms as are
just."' 4
131 See Part II.C.2.
132 See, for example, Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in
Racial Profiling Cases, 100 Colum L Rev 1815, 1822 (2000) (discussing courts' line-drawing ap-
proaches in racial profiling cases); Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and
Adjudicate Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 NYU L Rev 242,262 n 103 (2000) (zoning);
Glenn J. Moramarco, Beyond "Magic Words": Using Self-Disclosure to Regulate Electioneering,
49 Cath U L Rev 107,129-30 (1999) (discussing the First Amendment).
133 See, for example, Chase International, Inc v Link and Pan of Texas, Inc, 1995 US Dist
LEXIS 11981, *2 (N D Ill) (lamenting federal courts' "[o]vercrowded dockets").
134 FRCP 60(b).
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The proposal that courts should vary the terms of the remedy
based on the specifics of the case before them is not inconsistent with
this Comment's advocacy of a bright line rule for the allocation of the
burden. Indeed, the exact nature of remedies, by definition, are virtu-
ally always a function of the facts of the particular case. A remedy is
"anything a court can do for a litigant who has been wronged or is
about to be wronged..".. Determining what should be done for the
wronged or prospectively wronged litigant then necessarily involves
examining the specific circumstances of the dispute. Each of the two
most important classes of remedies, damages and injunctions, seeks to
craft a solution sensitive to the specific facts of a given dispute. '
Compensatory damages are designed to "make plaintiff as well off as
he would have been if he never had been wronged.".. The fashioning
of such a remedy necessarily entails an inquiry into the details of the
case at hand. Similarly, injunctions, which are "order[s] from a court to
litigants ordering them to do or to refrain from doing some specific
thing,"' are also a class of remedies requiring an assessment of the
case specific facts. This Comment's proposed approach strikes a sensi-
ble balance. While courts should determine ex ante the procedural
rules allocating the burden of proof, the remedy must account for the
salient, case specific facts.
Thus, where the court concludes that the issuing court's judgment
is void for lack of personal jurisdiction, a district court may impose tai-
lored conditions on the parties pursuant to the granting of the motion
to vacate. Such conditions might include requiring the defendant to
accept service of process,' requiring the defendant to bear costs in
connection with the default judgment, "° or where the defendant's con-
duct has been particularly obstructionist or evasive, the court, as an
135 Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 1 (cited in note 19).
136 See id (identifying damages and injunctions as flowing from the courts' determination of
harm done).
137 Id at 3.
138 Id.
139 See China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 at *25 (conditioning grant of Rule
60(b)(4) motion on defendant's future acceptance of service of process); Triad Energy Corp v
McNeil, 110 FRD 382,386 (S D NY 1986) (vacating judgment but permitting plaintiff to re-serve
defendant through alternate means).
140 See Leab v Streit, 584 F Supp 748, 763 (S D NY 1984) (conditioning the grant of the
Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the defendant's assuming the plaintiffs' costs in litigating the motion to
vacate and directing plaintiffs to re-serve defendant in the substitute manner designated by the
court); Schwab v Bullock's, Inc, 508 F2d 353.356 (9th Cir 1975) (reversing the district court's de-
nial of the defendant's 60(b)(4) motion to vacate for lack of improper service but instructing the
district court to "determine whether in light of the record as a whole the equities demand that
[defendant] bear all or a portion of [plaintiffs] expenses in connection with the default judg-
ment, the motion to vacate, and the attendant delay").
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ancillary remedy,"' could also issue an attachment '4 2 against a portion
of the defendant's assets.
Courts adopting the Rockwell rule can mitigate any inequities
that might otherwise result from allocating the burden to the plaintiff.
This proposed rule is sensible for three main reasons.
1. Horizontal consistency.
Courts should adopt this Comment's proposed approach because
it fits horizontally with the existing legal rules 3 for allocating the bur-
den of proof in motions challenging personal jurisdiction under Rules
12 and 55. First, the Rockwell rule fits with the well-established view
that plaintiffs bear the burden when their version of the jurisdictional
facts is challenged for the first time in a prejudgment motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12.4 In a default judgment, the defendant has not yet
challenged the personal jurisdiction of the court; a default necessarily
involves a lack of appearance by the defendant. Thus, despite the pas-
sage of time, the plaintiff is still in the same relation to the defendant
regarding the jurisdictional issue as in a 12(b) motion. The plaintiff has
not yet been forced to prove the court's personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Where possible, it is critical that the court have the oppor-
tunity to evaluate the parties' jurisdictional claims with the full benefit
of counsel representing both sides of the question. Accordingly, the
plaintiff should retain the burden.'
45
Courts adopting the Rohm rule fail to do justice to the command
that the plaintiff always offer "events or circumstances that it charac-
141 "Ancillary remedies are designed in aid of other remedies." Laycock, Modern American
Remedies at 5 (cited in note 19).
142 An attachment is "[t]he process of seizing another's property ... for the purpose of se-
curing satisfaction of a judgment." Black's Law Dictionary at 126 (cited in note 6). See also Lay-
cock, Modern American Remedies at 826 (cited in note 19) (defining an attachment as a "levy or
garnishment before judgment").
143 See Edward S. Adams and Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Rea-
soning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 Vand L Rev 1243, 1283 n 247 (1999) (noting the
recent rise in the importance of "horizontal coherence" in the Supreme Court's statutory inter-
pretation methodology).
144 See note 22 and accompanying text. Even the Seventh Circuit, in Bally itself, adopts this
proposition. See Bally, 804 F2d at 401 ("[lt is well established that the plaintiff must prove juris-
diction exists once it is challenged by the defendant.").
145 The importance to our American legal system of ensuring personal jurisdiction limits is
well-recognized. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 15A Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 39.11.4 at 422 (West 2d ed 1992) (noting the "intrinsic im-
portance of personal jurisdiction limits"); Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Plaintiffs Lose Their
Constitutional Rights?, 1996 Wis L Rev 263, 265 (recognizing "that personal jurisdiction [is] the
touchstone of due process"). It is for this reason that in the context of 60(b)(4) motions, the
weighty finality interest yields to the interest of ensuring the court's personal jurisdiction. A final
judgment, though final, will not be enforced where it is a "legal nullity" because "the rendering
court lacked ... jurisdiction." Carter v Fenner, 136 F3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir 1998).
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terizes as meeting state statutory and federal due process standards."''
In a motion to vacate a default judgment, the plaintiff has yet to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction, and thus, the presumption from Rule 12
should not shift. As a federal appellate court stated in another context,
"the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court has the
burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists, and the burden may not
be shifted to the party challenging the jurisdiction.' 47
This Comment's proposed rule is also consistent with the even
more analogous rule that the plaintiff bears the burden in opposing
motions to set aside the entry of default (as distinguished from default
judgment).' This issue, whether or not that burden remains with the
plaintiff, is precisely the one at play in determining which party should
shoulder the burden of proof in motions opposing default judgments
on personal jurisdiction grounds under Rule 60(b)(4). The two provi-
sions for attacking an adverse default are closely related. First, the
language in Rules 55 and 60 authorizing relief from entry of default
and default judgment is similar. 14 Second, the two types of attacks oc-
cur at nearly the same stage in the litigation process. Both occur after
the entry of default but before the defendant has responded to the
plaintiff's complaint. Consonant with these parallels between motions
to vacate an entry of default and a default judgment, this Comment's
proposed approach would make the burden of proof rule the same for
the two similar motions.
By placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction when
the defendant moves to vacate under Rule 60(b)(4), the proposed rule
differs from courts' allocation of the burden for the other Rule 60(b)
motions advanced pursuant to 60(b)(1)-(3) and 60(b)(5)-(6).'O This
146 Rockwell, 83 FRD at 559. See also United States v Swiss American Bank, 191 F3d 30, 40
(1st Cir 1999) (describing as "certainly correct" the proposition that "plaintiff[s] ... shoulder the
burden of proving personal jurisdiction over the defendant"); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation,
120 F Supp 2d 45,57 (D DC 2000), citing Naartex Consulting Corp v Watt, 722 F2d 779,785 (DC
Cir 1983) ("It is well-established that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing personal jurisdic-
tion over defendants."). Similarly, in Packard Press Corp v Corn Vu Corp, 584 F Supp 73,76 (E D
Pa 1984), the court emphasized the importance of valid jurisdiction, which justified this burden
allocation. In reviewing a 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a default judgment for lack of personal ju-
risdiction, the court stated that it "has a continuing duty to ensure that such jurisdiction exists be-
fore advancing to the merits." Id. "When the court's in personam jurisdiction is challenged by the
defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the non-resident defendant's activities in the forum state
are sufficient to bring it within the reach of this court's jurisdiction." Id.
147 Product Promotions, Inc v Cousteau, 495 F2d 483, 490 (5th Cir 1974) (examining the
reach of Texas's long-arm statute).
148 See Part I.B.2.
149 Under Rule 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for any "good cause shown."
FRCP 55(c). Rule 60(b) also employs a rather open-ended grant of judicial discretion, providing
that the reviewing court may relieve a party from a final judgment "upon such terms as are just."
FRCP 60(b).
150 See Roberts, Annotation, 59 ALR Fed at 836 (cited in note 5) (noting that in 60(b)(4)
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does not, however, render the proposed rule horizontally inconsistent.
As demonstrated, Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate a default judgment
for lack of personal jurisdiction are functionally similar to Rule 12
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Rule 55 mo-
tions to vacate an entry of default advanced on personal jurisdiction
grounds.
While Rule 60(b)(4) attacks are in title similar to the other Rule
60 attacks in that they are motions to vacate default judgments, courts
have repeatedly recognized at least three critical functional differ-
ences between motions to vacate under Rule 60(b)(4) and other Rule
60 motions. First, a court has no discretion to decline to vacate a
judgment once it concludes a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4),
but courts do have discretion when deciding motions to vacate relying
on one of the other Rule 60 subrules.' This distinction goes to the
heart of the difference between Rule 60(b)(4) motions and the other
60(b) motions to vacate: to allege that a default is void is to argue that
the motions lacks legal validity, but to allege mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, ' newly discovered evidence, ' fraud or
misrepresentation," release of the judgment, ' or some "other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" '' 6 is not to allege
that the judgment lacks legal validity, but only that it is based on legal
error or requires modification."'
Second, courts have consistently held that unlike motions under
Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), there is no time limit for Rule 60(b)(4) motions. '
Third, and related to the idea that void judgments are per se inva-
lid whereas objections advanced on the other Rule 60(b) bases are
motions, the burden of proof "may fall on the adversary party, whereas the burden of proof of
the other grounds of the motion is typically on the moving party").
151 See id ("The court has no discretion to decline to vacate a default judgment or decree
under (4), whereas it does have such discretion where one of the other rules is relied on."). See
also Carter v Tenner, 136 F3d 1000,1005 (5th Cir 1998) (collecting cases); Roberts, Annotation, 59






157 See Carter, 136 F3d at 1005 ("Unlike motions pursuant to other subsections of Rule
60(b), Rule 60(b)(4) motions leave no margin for consideration of the district court's discretion
as the judgments themselves are by definition legal nullities or not.").
158 See Roberts, Annotation, 59 ALR Fed at 836 n 5 (cited in note 5) (collecting cases). See
also Carter, 136 F3d at 1006 ("Motions brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) ... constitute such ex-
ceptional circumstances as to relieve litigants from the normal standards of timeliness associated
with the rule .... [M]otions brought pursuant to subsection (4) of the rule have no set time limit
.... [E]ven the requirement that the motion be made within a 'reasonable time,' which seems lit-
erally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class of
motion."); Orner v Shalala, 30 F3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir 1994) (noting that there is no time limit
for Rule 60(b) motions).
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only an assertion of error, courts have consistently held that defen-
dants moving pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) need not show a meritorious
defense to the action beyond demonstrating the lack of personal ju-
risdiction. ' While Rule 60(b)(4) motions are functionally similar to
Rule 12 and Rule 55 motions attacking personal jurisdiction,,m
60(b)(4) motions are not viewed by courts in tandem with the other
subrules of Rule 60; the proposed rule would therefore ensure hori-
zontal consistency in interpretation with the functionally similar fed-
eral rules.
Additionally, the proposed rule, unlike the allocation of the bur-
den of proof in most overall causes of action, would allocate the bur-
den of proof to the nonmovant. ' However, there are numerous con-
texts in which courts have held that the nonmovant bears the burden
of proof.'6 Moreover, it is particularly appropriate to assign the burden
to the nonmovant given that courts have repeatedly held in the highly
analogous Rule 55 context that to do so is proper. 6 Thus, as a doc-
trinal matter, the horizontal consistency promoted by the proposed
rule may be by itself dispositive. However, several policy-based rea-
sons further support the proposed rule.
2. Information eliciting.
The Comment's proposed approach is attractive as a policy mat-
ter because it may operate as an information-eliciting rule, permitting
courts to give a more searching review of personal jurisdiction.'" This
dynamic is likely because the allocation of the burden appears to drive
159 See Giraldi v Heep, 1999 US App LEXIS 34309, *6 (4th Cir) (unpublished opinion)
("Unlike the other grounds under Rule 60(b) ... the movant need not establish a meritorious
defense."); In re Brackett, 243 BR 910, 914 n 7 (Bankr N D Ga 2000) ("If a judgment is void, no
proof is required that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense or that the other party will
not be prejudiced by having the judgment set aside."); Roberts, Annotation, 59 ALR at 837 & n 9
(cited in note 5).
160 See Part I.B.
161 See McCormick, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 428 (cited in note 20) (stating that
the burden of proof is generally assigned to the party who "seeks to change the present state of
affairs").
162 See, for example, Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 324 (1986) (recognizing that for
certain causes of action, "the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial" and that in
the context of summary judgment, where the movant meets a minimum threshold of proof in
support of summary judgment, the nonmovant assumes the burden of "go[ing] beyond the plead-
ings and ... designat[ing] 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial'), quoting
FRCP 56(e).
163 See notes 36-44 and the accompanying text.
164 A more searching review is not inconsistent with improved efficiency. By using incen-
tives to increase the likelihood of parties' developing a clear record through the pleadings, the
proposed rule may make courts' work in identifying the relevant jurisdictional facts less onerous.
Consider China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS 2674 at *1 n 1 ("The Court's summary of the
procedural background ... is made with little help from the parties, who have neglected to pro-
vide comprehensive, narrative statements of facts in their memoranda of law.").
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outcomes: of the reported cases where a court evaluating a Rule
60(b)(4) motion advanced on grounds of personal jurisdiction both
expressly allocated the burden of proof and disposed of the motion on
personal jurisdiction grounds, the party bearing the burden of proof
has lost over 90 percent of the time.161 The allocation of the burden of
proof in 60(b)(4) motions advanced on personal jurisdiction grounds
may matter tremendously to the parties. Thus, the proposed rule
would create an outcome-driven incentive for plaintiffs to identify af-
firmatively for the reviewing district court evidence of minimum con-
165 These cases were generated by reviewing the set of cases generated by searching in the
Westlaw "ALLFEDS" database for "60(b)(4) or 60(B)(4) 'motion to vacate' and burden or proof
or prove" and then selecting only those cases which met the following three conditions: (i) the
60(b)(4) motion was argued on personal jurisdiction grounds; (ii) the court expressly allocated
the burden of proof; and (iii) the court disposed of the motion on personal jurisdiction grounds,
rather than vacating on a different basis such as one of the other 60(b) subrules concomitantly
advanced.
In 23 out of 25 such reported cases, or 92 percent, the allocation of the burden has dictated
the outcome; that is, the party bearing the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction
has lost on the 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
This phenomenon is evident in both cases where the motion to vacate is granted and where it is
denied.
For cases in which the court allocated the burden to the nonmovant and granted the motion
to vacate, see Popper, 48 F Supp 2d at 268; Packard Press Corp v Com Vu Corp, 584 F Supp 73 (E
D Pa 1984) (granting the 60(b) motion on grounds other than jurisdiction but first recognizing
that the nonmovant plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction);
Donnely, 87 FRD at 80; Rockwell, 83 FRD at 556; DiCesare, 421 F Supp at 116; Southmark San
Juan, Inc v Abbas Atash-Sobh, 1994 WL 1031279 (Va Cir Ct 1994). But see Sterling Industrial
Corp v Telephone, Inc, 484 F Supp 1294 (W D Mich 1980).
Similarly, for cases allocating the burden to the movant and denying the motion to vacate,
see Drexler v Kozloff, 2000 US App LEXIS 67 (10th Cir) (describing district court's order allo-
cating the burden to the defendant and denying the motion to vacate); Bally Export, 804 F2d 398;
Jones v Jones, 217 F3d 239 (7th Cir 1954); In re Brackett, 243 BR 910 (N D Ga 2000); Invest l'Inc
v ITS International, Inc, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 17915 (N D I11); Carr v Pouilloux, SA, 947 F Supp
393 (C D I11 1996); Chase International, Inc v Link and Pan of Texas, Inc, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
11981 (N D I11); Ocala Waste DisposalAssociates v GGC, 1993 US Dist LEXIS 5578 (S D NY);
O'Brien Sage Group, Inc, 141 FRD 181 (N D Ill 1992); Miller, 779 F Supp at 207; International
Housing Ltd v Rafidain Bank Iraq, 712 F Supp 1112 (S D NY 1989); Schubert's Marine Sales and
Service, Inc v M/V Reeter 1I, 724 F Supp 1229 (N D I11 1989); Vaughn Products, Inc v Foliage
Farms of Mississippi, Inc, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 2953 (N D I11); Mid-Continent Wood Products, Inc
v Harris, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 13109 (N D Ill); International Financial Services v Ross Industries,
1991 US Dist LEXIS 3073 (N D I11); Triad Energy Corp v McNeil, 110 FRD 382 (S D NY 1986);
Rohm, 103 FRD at 541; Jardine, Gill & Duffus, Inc v MIV Cassiopeia, 523 F Supp 1076 (D MD
1981). But see China Mariners', 1999 US Dist LEXIS at 2674.
While only a small number of courts have ruled specifically on the allocation of the burden
of proof, courts regularly review parties' (typically defendants') Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate
a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many courts fail to articulate
explicitly the controlling burden of proof on the issue. See, for example, Textile Banking Co v
Rentschler, 657 F2d 844 (7th Cir 1981) (affirming lower court's denial of a 60(b)(4) motion ad-
vanced on personal jurisdiction grounds where neither court articulated a burden of proof);
United Bank of Kuwait PLC v Enventure Enhanced Oil Recovery Associates-Charco Redondo
Butane, 755 F Supp 1195 (S D NY 1989) (denying motion to vacate without articulating a bur-
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tacts and service of process that serves as the basis for the court's per-
sonal jurisdiction.
In contrast, the Rohm rule requires defendants to prove a nega-
tive proposition, that the court lacks jurisdiction. Courts and commen-
tators have recognized the difficulties of requiring a party to prove a
negative in a number of contexts outside of personal jurisdiction.'6
Requiring plaintiffs to prove the positive proposition of valid jurisdic-
tion is more likely to elicit the necessary information germane to de-
termining the court's personal jurisdiction. 16 To meet their burden un-
der the proposed rule, plaintiffs must ensure that the court recognizes
the bases for the exercise of its personal jurisdiction. This dynamic
may have two additional benefits. First, by increasing the likelihood
that courts will be exposed to the key jurisdictional facts, the proposed
rule will aid district court judges in fulfilling their "independent, con-
stitutional obligation to protect the jurisdictional limits of the federal
courts."' Second, because the proposed rule may elicit a clearer fac-
tual basis from plaintiffs regarding personal jurisdiction, the issue of
personal jurisdiction will be better illuminated in the record on ap-
peal. ' While only one circuit court of appeals has expressly addressed
the issue of which party has the burden of proof on Rule 60(b)(4) mo-
tions,7' courts of appeals are fairly regularly confronted with review of
district courts' disposition of such motions.'
166 See Sean M. Moran, Note, The Presumption of Correctness: Should the Commissioner Be
Required to Carry the Initial Burden of Production?, 55 Fordham L Rev 1087,1097 (1987) (not-
ing that a number of circuit courts of appeals have held that, in the context of income tax law, the
initial burden of production is best placed on the Internal Revenue Service because, otherwise,
the taxpayer is placed in the difficult position of proving the nonexistence of unreported in-
come); J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U Chi L Rev
115,167-68 (1998) (noting that it is more difficult for employers to determine negative informa-
tion about prospective employees than it is for employers to determine positive information).
167 Rule 60(b)(4) caselaw suggests that parties may need procedural incentives to present
courts with the full story. While it is difficult as an empirical matter to know whether courts typi-
cally have valid personal jurisdiction over defendants challenging under Rule 60(b)(4), the fact
that courts do with some regularity grant the motion suggests that some percentage of the cases
have merit.
168 Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v Prudential Ins Co, 933 F Supp 246, 249 (S D NY 1996).
See also note 145.
169 See, for example, Enron Oil Corp v Diakuhara, 10 F3d 90, 96 (2d Cir 1993) ("[T]he
importance of an explanation by the district court for its denial of a motion to vacate ... is self-
evident. The absence of an explanation defeats intelligent appellate review."); General Contract-
ing, 899 F2d at 115-16 (criticizing the district court for placing the burden of proof on the defen-
dant and stating "[it is impossible, on this chiaroscuro record, to state with any assurance
whether or not the court had jurisdiction").
170 See Bally, 804 F2d at 401.
171 For recent examples, see Girardi v Heep, 1999 US App LEXIS 34309, *3 (4th Cir) (un-
published opinion) (reviewing appeal based on lack of notice argument pursuant to 60(b)(4));
Mehdipour v City of Oklahoma City, 1999 US App LEXIS 3455 (10th Cir) (unpublished opin-
ion); Carter v Fenner, 136 F3d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir 1998); Wilmer v Board of County Commission-
ers of Leavenworth County, 69 F3d 406, 410 (10th Cir 1995); Sea-Land Service, Inc v Ceramica
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3. Fairness, comity, and resolution of disputes in a single
proceeding.
Finally, as a matter of policy, the proposed rule promotes fairness.
Defendants following the wait and challenge tactic assume significant
strategic risks independent of the burden of proof. If the defendant
loses on the jurisdictional issue in that procedural posture, the defen-
dant waives the right to defend on the merits." Moreover, in cases
where the defendant waits until the court of registration begins en-
forcement of the default judgment by attaching the defendant's assets,
the defendant risks subjecting its assets to the judicial process even if
the judgment eventually proves to be void. " '
By adopting the Rockwell rule but using the remedy to account
for any unfairness, this Comment's proposed rule strikes the right bal-
ance by avoiding the additional burden of extra risk on the defendant
through the loss of the advantageous burden of proof. There are sev-
eral potential problems of unfairness with allocating the burden of
proof to the plaintiff. First, the Rohm court's comment that it is "not
unfair" to place the burden on the defendant where the defendant
knows of the original suit but declines to appear" ' may be premised on
the fear that if the allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff is
maintained, defendants will successfully avoid the requirements of
litigation and suffer no adverse consequences from the default. How-
ever, as the two types of risk discussed above show, this assumption is
faulty; thus the Rohm court's concern is overstated. A second concern
predicated on fairness is the potential loss of evidence. Where many
years have passed since the default judgment, there is a valid fear of
"prejudice against a plaintiff who, owing to delay, might in subsequent
collateral proceedings no longer have evidence of personal jurisdic-
tion that existed at the time of the underlying suit.' 7
Europa I1, Inc, 160 F3d 849,852 (1st Cir 1998).
172 See Practical Concepts Inc v Republic of Bolivia, 811 F2d 1543, 1547 (DC Cir 1987). See
also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 65 cmt b (1982) ("When [a defendant knows] about
the action but perceive[s] that the court lack[s] ... jurisdiction, he is given a right to ignore the
proceeding at his own risk.").
173 See, for example, Practical Concepts v Republic of Bolivia, 613 F Supp 863, 865 (D DC
1985) (noting that although the defendant, Bolivia, acknowledged service of the complaint, its
counsel did not appear in the action until over one month after the Court issued attachments to
several United States banks against Bolivian embassy accounts), revd on other grounds, 811 F2d
1543. The risks presented by the prospect of an attachment are significant. See Laycock, Modern
American Remedies at 827 (cited in note 19) (noting the "disruptive impact of the attachment"
when a business faces an attachment against its "operating funds, or the inventory available for
sale, or the equipment used to manufacture or deliver the product").
174 Rohm, 103 FRD at 544.
175 Miller, 779 F Supp at 210-11.
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Additionally, shouldering the plaintiff with the burden of proof
may infringe on the plaintiff's interest "in the choice of forum."
Where the plaintiff is forced to litigate in the district of the court of
registration in order to seek collection of the judgment, this infringe-
ment may translate into significant costs to the plaintiff. This Com-
ment's proposed rule, however, permits courts to account for any such
problems by attaching conditions in cases where the court grants the
motion to vacate. A court may attach such conditions as requiring that
the defendant stipulate to service of process where the defendant's de-
lay has caused the loss of evidence." ' Additionally, where the defen-
dant's delay has caused the plaintiff to expend great resources, courts
may grant the motion with the condition that the defendant pay the
plaintiff's attorney's fees."" Moreover, in extreme cases of defendants'
evasiveness, the court may hold out the specter of an ancillary remedy
of attachment to enforce the defendant's cooperation."
The Miller court articulated two additional policy interests that
may militate against the Rockwell rule. First was "the concerns of
comity among the district courts of the United States."' While this
point is valid, it is of limited force. The rule that a judgment issued
without valid personal jurisdiction is void also infringes, in a sense, on
comity among district courts whenever one court voids the judgment
of another. Nonetheless, that rule is beyond reproach.1 ' Second, the
court in Miller pointed to "the interest in resolving disputes in a single
judicial proceeding."'2 While, for reasons of efficiency, finality, and re-
pose this interest may be important, by the time a plaintiff has ob-
tained an entry of default, a default judgment, and then registered that
judgment in one or more judicial districts, the dispute has already en-
compassed several proceedings. The damage to the interest in resolv-
ing disputes in a single proceeding has been inflicted before any rules
concerning the allocation of the burden of proof on the motion to va-
cate take effect. Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof to the
plaintiff will have, at best, marginal impact on the systemic interests of
comity and finality.
176 Id at 210.
177 For examples of courts attaching conditions to the grant of a 60(b)(4) motion to vacate
for lack of personal jurisdiction, see notes 139-40.
178 See, for example, Schwab v Bullock's Inc, 508 F2d 353,356 (9th Cir 1974) (ordering dis-
trict court on remand to consider whether defendant should bear plaintiff's costs associated with
default judgment and motion to vacate).
179 See notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
180 Miller, 779 F Supp at 210.
181 See the cases cited in note 7 and accompanying text.
182 779 F Supp at 210.
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CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the Rockwell rule allocating the burden of
proof to the plaintiff in Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate a default
judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. In adopting this
rule, courts should reject the recent trend embodied by Rohm and the
two outlier approaches. However, courts should condition the remedy
to mitigate any prejudice resulting from this allocation of the burden.
This Comment's proposed rule is doctrinally attractive because it
promotes horizontal consistency across analogous motions advanced
under Rules 12, 55, and 60, and normatively attractive because it pro-
vides notice, promotes efficiency, elicits information, and ensures fair-
ness. By adopting this Comment's proposed rule, federal courts could
move away from the current conflict and towards a consistent, sensi-
ble rule.
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